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OFF-SITE MITIGATION AND THE EIS
THRESHOLD: NEPA'S FAULTY
FRAMEWORK
MARC R. B ULSON*
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1 requires federal
agencies to consider the potential environmental impact of certain pro-
posed federal actions,2 in part, through the disclosure of these im-
pacts.3 In addition to educating and informing agencies, NEPA's
disclosure requirement provides the public with an opportunity to
scrutinize an agency's assessment of a project's environmental ramifica-
* B.A. Union College, 1987; J.D. Washington University, 1990. Marc Bulson is an
Associate with the law firm of Hoyle, Morris & Kerr in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat.
852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988)) [hereinafter
NEPA].
2. See Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Inform., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Conm'n, 481 F.2d
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court defined what constitutes a federal action under
NEPA as follows:
There is "Federal action" within the meaning of the statute not only when an
agency proposes to build a facility itself, but also whenever an agency makes a
decision which permits action by other parties which will affect the quality of the
environment. NEPA's impact statement procedure has been held to apply where a
federal agency approves a lease of land to private parties, grants licenses and per-
mits to private parties, or approves and funds state highway projects. In each of
these instances the federal agency took action affecting the environment in the
sense that the agency made a decision which permitted some other party, private or
governmental, to take action affecting the environment.
Id. at 1088-89 (citations omitted).
3. To ensure that federal agencies comply with this mandate, NEPA requires every
federal agency involved in the planning of a major federal action significantly affecting
the environment to prepare a detailed statement regarding:
Washington University Open Scholarship
102 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 41:101
tions and to suggest possible measures to mitigate any detrimental im-
pacts.4 Citizen suits brought against agencies serve as the only
mechanism to prevent the agencies from ignoring or inadequately re-
viewing potential environmental impacts.5
Congress created the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) to
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the pro-
posal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any
detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the
comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise
with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and
the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies,
which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be
made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the
public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review processes;
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
NEPA's policy statement, included in part in 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2 (1990) states:
Federal agencies shall to the fullest extent possible:
je)" Use the NEPA process to identify and assess the reasonable alternatives to
proposed actions that will avoid or minimize adverse effects of these actions upon
the quality of the human environment.
(f) Use all practicable means... to... avoid or minimize any possible adverse
effects of their actions upon the quality of the human environment.
Id. See Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d
609, 620 (10th Cir. 1987) ('NEPA... reflects an important public policy of this nation:
the avoidance of precipitous federal decision making at the agency level which may fail
to adequately consider the environmental ramifications of agency actions."); Preserva-
tion Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that NEPA is
essentially a procedural and disclosure statute, enacted to ensure that federal agencies
generate information concerning the potential impacts of federal actions on the
environment).
4. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold
Issues, 55 TEx. L. REv. 801, 806 (1977) (noting that NEPA ensures the public's aware-
ness of the environmental consequences of federal actions).
5. See Daniel A. Dreyfus & Helen M. Ingram, The National Environmental Policy
Act: A View of Intent and Practice, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 243, 255 (1976) (noting that
"[tihe threat of litigation was intended as an incentive to agencies to make a fair ap-
praisal"). See also Hanna J. Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation: The
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 16 NAT. REsoURCES J. 323, 334 (1976)
(noting that "to the extent implementation of NEPA requirements has been achieved,
judicial activity has been the primary catalyst of change").
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help federal agencies implement NEPA's policy.6 Pursuant to its con-
gressional mandate, the CEQ has promulgated a series of regulations
setting forth procedural guidelines that federal agencies must follow to
comply with NEPA's disclosure requirement.7 These regulations re-
quire that the "action agency," prior to approving a federal action, pre-
pare an environmental assessment (EA)' documenting the proposed
action's potential impact on the environment. The "action agency"
must then decide whether to prepare a more comprehensive environ-
mental impact statement (EIS)9 or to issue a finding of no significant
6. See 40 C.F.R. § 1515.2 (1990). In Exec. Order No. 11,991(1), 3 C.F.R. 123, 124
(1977), President Carter declared that CEQ regulations bind the agencies acting under
NEPA. Id. Cf., Note, NEPA After Andrus v. Sierra Club: The Doctrine of Substantial
Deference to the Regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality, 66 VA. L. Rnv.
843, 844-45 (1980) (stating that CEQ regulations are entitled to substantial deference).
7. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1500.6 (1990). "NEPA procedures must insure that
environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions
are made and before actions are taken. The information must be of high quality." Id.
at § 1500.1(b).
8. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1990) provides that "[iln deter-
mining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement the Federal agency shall
... prepare an environmental assessment." d. However, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(2)
(1990), provides an exception to this requirement if the project "[n]ormally does not
require either an environmental impact statement or an environmental assessment." Id.
CEQ regulations define an environmental assessment:
"Environmental assessment":
(a) Means a concise public document for which a Federal agency is responsible
that serves to:
(1) Briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether
to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact.
(2) Aid an agency's compliance with the Act when no environmental impact
statement is necessary.
(3) Facilitate preparation of a statement when one is necessary.
(b) Shall include brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives
as required by section 102(2)(E), of the environmental impacts of the proposed
action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted.
Id. at § 1508.9.
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for a discussion of environmental impact
statements. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988) outlines the circumstances under which an
agency must prepare an EIS. See also 40 C.F.R § 1502.1 (1990) (providing that the
purpose of an EIS is to "provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental
impacts and shall inform decision-makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives
which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts"). Similarly, in Methow Valley Citi-
zens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989),
the court noted:
There are two purposes served by preparation of an EIS. The statement should
"provide decision-makers with an environmental disclosure sufficiently detailed to
1992]
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impact (FONSI).1° A FONSI reflects the agency's determination that
there is no need for an EIS. 11
Commonly, agencies include mitigation techniques in the proposed
plan during the EA's preparation to circumvent the EIS requirement.12
aid in the substantive decision whether to proceed with the project in light of its
environmental consequences," as well as "provide the public with information and
an opportunity to participate in gathering information."
Id. (quoting Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974) and
Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1985)). See
also Charles F. Weiss, Note, FederalAgency Treatment of Uncertainty in Environmental
Impact Statements Under the CEQ's Amended NEPA Regulation § 1502.22: Worst Case
Analysis or Risk Threshold?, 86 MICH. L. REv. 777, 786 n.36 (1988) (stressing the im-
portance of the role the EIS plays in agency decision-making (citing O'Hare, Improving
the Use of Information in Environmental Decision Making, 1 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESS-
MENT REV. 229 (1980))). See generally SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES
THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM (1984).
10. A FONSI provides the public and the courts with a statement of the agency's
reasons for its decision not to prepare an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1990) provides:
"Finding of no significant impact" means a document by a Federal agency briefly
presenting the reasons why an action, not otherwise excluded (§ 1508.4), will not
have a significant effect on the human environment and for which an environmen-
tal impact statement therefore will not be prepared. It shall include the environ-
mental assessment or a summary of it and shall note any other environmental
documents related to it (§ 1501.7(a)(5)). If the assessment is included, the finding
need not repeat any of the discussion in the assessment but may incorporate it by
reference.
Id.
See also DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 7.10 (1984)
(outlining CEQ regulations and the process agencies must follow to ascertain whether
an EIS is necessary); Debra L. Donahue, Comment, Taking a Hard Look at Mitigation:
The Case for the Northwest Indian Rule, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 687, 695 (1988) (discuss-
ing the principles underlying the preparation of a FONSI). 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (1990)
provides the circumstances under which an EA must be prepared and Section 1501.4
(a)-(c) (1990) outlines when an EIS should be prepared. In addition, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.9(a)(1) (1990), which defines an EA, requires an EA to contain enough informa-
tion to determine whether to prepare an EIS or a FONSI. Federal actions which re-
quire neither the filing of an EIS nor an EA are called "categorical exclusions." 40
C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1990). See also 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(b) (1990). It is also possible for an
agency to prepare an EIS without first preparing an EA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(a)
(1990).
11. An agency's decision to forego preparing an EIS is commonly called the
"threshold issue." See Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United
States Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that "in cases in-
volving genuine issues as to health, and environmental resources, there is a relatively
low threshold for impact statements").
12. See Albert I. Herson, Project Mitigation Revisited: Most Courts Approve Find-
ings of No Significant Impact Justified by Mitigation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 51 (1986) (dis-
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The agencies adopt mitigation measures to effectively minimize "signif-
icant" environmental impacts so that they can avoid preparing an EIS
and, instead, issue a FONSI.13 Traditionally, agencies changed their
proposed plans with on-site mitigation techniques.14 On-site mitiga-
tion involves minimizing a project's impact on the environment by im-
plementing limits on the degree or magnitude of the agency action at
the project site itself. 5
In recent years, agencies have also adopted off-site mitigation meas-
ures to support a FONSI. 16 Off-site mitigation occurs when the federal
cussing the use of mitigation in EAs to support the issuance of a FONSI); see also Paul
G. Kent & John A. Pendergrass, Has NEPA Become a Dead Issue? Preliminary Results
of a Comprehensive Study of NEPA Litigation, 5 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 11 (1986)
(citing statistics showing that most NEPA litigation involves challenges to agency deci-
sions to not prepare an EIS).
13. See Herson, supra note 12, at 52 (contending that although CEQ regulations
require an EIS to discuss mitigation measures, they do not explicitly state whether miti-
gation measures can support a FONSI); see also Eric Glitzenstein, Project Modification:
Illegitimate Circumvention of the EIS Requirement or Desirable Means to Reduce Ad-
verse Environmental Impacts?, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 253 (1982).
14. See, eg., LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389, 399 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that
mitigation measures can justify an agency's explanation of no significant environmental
impact); Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d
609, 622 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that the Forest Service's imposition of stipulatory
controls for operations subsequent to the issuance of federal oil and gas leases can miti-
gate unacceptable environmental impacts); Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 829 (9th Cir.
1986) (explaining that an agency's decision not to prepare an environmental impact
statement may be justified by conditions mitigating environmental effects);
Steamboaters v. FERC, 759 F.2d 1382, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that "[m]easures
designed to mitigate the environmental consequences of a project may justify an
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS"); Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson,
685 F.2d 678, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that the Forest Service's decision not to
prepare an EIS in relation to exploratory drilling in a wilderness area was not arbitrary
where it conducted a thorough analysis of the proposed action and imposed mitigation
measures to address areas of environmental concern); Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Evans, 688
F. Supp. 579, 586 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (noting that the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice violated NEPA because it did not perform an EIS).
15. See, eg., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 680. In Cabinet Moun-
tains Wilderness, the agency imposed mitigation measures to minimize the impact that
drilling would have on the grizzly bear population. Id. These measures included limit-
ing drilling, prohibiting on-site overnight camping, and restricting daily helicopter
flights. Id.
16. See, eg., Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 678
F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (noting that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
purchased a parcel of wetlands to mitigate for the loss of wetlands due to a construction
project), aff'd, 866 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989); Friends of
the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 838 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that off-site mitigation
could consist of the substitution of wetlands so that an EIS is not required). See also
1992]
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agency suggests or approves the purchase of land at another location to
replace the land altered at the project site.17 The most controversial
implementation of off-site mitigation plans involves replacing natural
wetlands degraded in federal projects with man-made wetlands.18
Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985), where the
court held that mitigation measures, including extensive land dedications, conclusively
supported the agencies' decision not to prepare an EIS. Id. at 987. The court stressed
that such mitigation measures need not "completely compensate for any possible ad-
verse environmental impacts stemming from the original proposal." Id. (quoting Cabi-
net Mountains Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 682 (emphasis added)). Similarly, in
Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 859-60 (9th Cir. 1982), the court
held that the Boise redevelopment agency reasonably concluded there was no signifi-
cant impact on the historic environment and that an EIS was unnecessary.
17. A common example of off-site mitigation occurs when, prior to commencing
construction, a private developer applies to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for a
permit to develop wetlands. See Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir.
1986); Missouri Coalition For the Env't v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 678 F. Supp.
790 (E.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 866 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989).
Under NEPA, the Corps issues a permit when it is satisfied, after either preparing an
EA or an EIS, that the development will not significantly impact the environment. See
supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text for a discussion of EA and EIS. Thus, even
though the development will destroy existing wetlands, the Corps may issue a FONSI
on the pretence that the planned implementation of the off-site mitigation measures
(L, the purchase or replacement of wetlands elsewhere) technically reduces the impact
to below significant levels. See Hintz, 800 F.2d at 838.
While the replacement of degraded wetlands may be the most widely cited example of
off-site mitigation, wetlands are not the only environmental resource subject to this
technique. Land supporting deer herds has been purchased and preserved and fish
hatcheries constructed to mitigate the impact of a federal action. See Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1989) (noting that "[o]if-site
options discussed in the [EIS] included the use of zoning and tax incentives to limit
development on deer winter range and migration routes, encouragement of conservation
easements, and acquisition and management by local government of critical tracts of
land"); Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 367 (1989) (miti-
gating the effect of proposed dam construction on the migration and spawning of a large
number of anadromous fish through the construction of a hatchery).
18. See Thomas H. Kean, Protecting Wetlands - An Action Agenda, 6 ENVTL. Fo-
RUM, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 20 (noting that the EPA recently initiated a National Wetlands
Policy Forum). The author discusses the federal mitigation policy and its negative ef-
fect on the environment and the preservation of wetlands. Id. at 22-23. The most sig-
nificant complaints allege a lack of uniformity in implementing plans and the absence of
any explicit guidelines to which agencies can refer when implementing off-site mitiga-
tion proposals. Id. at 23. Critics of the off-site mitigation policy also charge that there
is no scientific body of evidence to prove that man-made wetlands are a substitute for
natural wetlands. See infra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the feasi-
bility of converting wetlands.
Despite these concerns, the Bush administration has recently set forth a new wetlands
policy which relies even more heavily on off-site mitigation or "mitigation banking."
See Federal Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands, 56 Fed.
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The proliferation and ready acceptance of off-site mitigation calls
into question the thoroughness of agency decision-making.19 Off-site
mitigation proposals differ from on-site measures and involve unique
considerations and interests deserving of exhaustive analysis. For ex-
ample, when land is purchased to mitigate the harm caused at the pro-
ject site, that land often must undergo extensive development for
conversion into a habitat similar to the one being destroyed.20 Pres-
ently, there are no guidelines in effect that specify how effective the
conversion must be in order to mitigate the impact at the project site to
insignificant levels.21
Occasionally, an off-site mitigation plan simply involves the
purchase of an identical existing ecosystem.22 The practical result is
the destruction of one ecosystem when there were originally two.
Agencies, however, have construed such plans as effectively mitigating
the harm to the environment even though a net loss in resources re-
sults.23 Significantly, in both of the above stated examples, a significant
level of damage to the environment remains at the project site. Under
NEPA, any significant impact at the project site requires the prepara-
tion of an EIS.24 Unfortunately, agencies have been permitted to over-
Reg. 40,446 (1991) (proposed Aug. 14, 1991). The mitigation banking system would
use "mitigation credits" to offset the loss of wetlands by restoring or creating new
wetlands.
19. Telephone interview with Fred Niermann, Army Corps of Engineers (Jan. 20,
1989).
20. See Jan Goldman-Carter, New Legislation Not "Business as Usual," 6 ENvTL.
FORUM, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 20 (1989). Discussing the feasibility of converting wetlands
and calling for more EPA sponsored research in this area, the author notes that "[a]ny
mitigation plan based on wetlands creation must recognize that created wetlands will
almost never fulfill the full range of functions of natural wetlands. Consequently, one
acre created for one acre destroyed will rarely compensate for the loss and so does not
achieve the goal of no net loss." Id. at 22.
21. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the usage of off-
site wetlands.
22. See, e.g., Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. Corps of Eng'rs of the United
States Army, 678 F. Supp. 790, 796 (E.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 866 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.),
cerL denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989) (agency purchased a thirteen acre parcel of already-
existing wetlands to replace the land the federal action was destroying).
23. See generally Goldman-Carter, supra note 20, at 22. The EPA recently com-
menced the National Wetlands Policy Forum to consider different perspectives on how
to implement a no net loss wetlands program. Id. at 20-22. When a federal agency
purchases wetlands to replace the wetlands it destroys, the net result is that where once
two wetlands existed only one remains. Id. Thus, there is a net loss. Id.
24. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NEPA
mandates.
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look this procedural mainstay of NEPA because the legislature has
failed to establish a statutory framework that clearly outlines the scope
and required sufficiency of off-site mitigation measures.
The unique nature of off-site mitigation also highlights the insuffi-
ciency of judicial review. In reviewing agency decisions to forego prep-
aration of an EIS, courts have interpreted NEPA as limiting their
analysis to a review of the agency's suggested mitigation measures so as
to avoid discussing whether the agency plan ultimately results in insig-
nificant environmental impacts.25 The courts' focus is on the means
employed by the agencies and not necessarily the results ultimately
achieved from their implementation. Imprecision of existing statutory
procedures prevent courts from engaging in a review which addresses
the unique problems inherent in off-site plans.26 Although recent cases
and commentary illustrate that a majority of courts are taking a
"harder look" at mitigation proposals,27 the failure to distinguish off-
site measures makes such review inadequate.
This Article addresses whether NEPA's current procedural struc-
ture allows off-site mitigation to excuse preparation of an EIS. Fur-
ther, this Article considers under what circumstances off-site
mitigation should be evaluated differently from on-site mitigation, and
what effect off-site mitigation measures should have on the EIS thresh-
old question. This Article will conclude with a proposal to amend the
CEQ regulations to ensure more thorough agency analysis of off-site
proposals and to allow for greater judicial scrutiny.
I. CEQ REGULATIONS, NEPA AND OFF-SITE MITIGATION:
STATUTORY ACTION?
Although NEPA does not explicitly permit agencies to reduce harm-
ful environmental impacts through mitigation, courts consistently hold
25. See Donahue, supra note 10, at 691-95 (considering the relationship between a
finding of no significant impact and mitigation measures). See also Geoffrey Garver,
Note, A New Approach to Review of NEPA Findings of No Significant Impact, 85 MIcH.
L. REv. 191, 216 (1986) (arguing that "because NEPA is designed to influence substan-
tive agency decisions through procedural mandates, the judicial role in reviewing
agency decisions to cut short those procedures must be especially rigorous"). See gener-
ally McGarity, supra note 4.
26. See infra notes 28-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interrela-
tionship between NEPA, CEQ Regulations and off-site mitigation.
27. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the weight the
court should give to the agency's consideration of mitigation measures.
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that such an option is at least implicit in its language.28 CEQ regula-
tions, which are binding on agencies whose acts fall within NEPA's
scope, support this statutory interpretation.29 Furthermore, agencies
assert, and the judiciary agrees, that off-site mitigation is permitted
under the regulations and that such measures can support the issuance
of a FONSI.3° Agencies support this contention with reference
to CEQ regulations which define mitigation as including
"[c]ompensat[ion] for the impact by replacing or providing substitute
resources or environments.
' 31
Closer examination of the CEQ regulations, however, reveals that
the CEQ included the mitigation requirement in the sections discussing
the EIS and did not mention mitigation as a justification for a
FONSI.32 Yet the regulations do not explicitly prevent agencies from
28. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351-52 (1989)
(NEPA implicitly requires a detailed analysis of mitigation procedures). See also 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii) (1988) (NEPA requires an EIS for "any adverse environmental
effects which cannot be avoided"); MANDELKER, supra note 10, at § 10:38 (NEPA im-
plicitly requires discussion of mitigation in impact statements).
29. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(0 (1990) (requiring the agency to "[i]nclude appropri-
ate mitigation measures not already included in the proposed action or alternatives");
40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(h) (1990) (requiring discussions of ways "to mitigate adverse envi-
ronmental impacts (if not fully covered under § 1502.14(0)").
30. See, eg., Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1986)
(off-site mitigation may serve "to relieve the Corps of the obligation of preparing an
EIS"); cf. Herson, supra note 12, at 52. Although Herson does not specifically discuss
off-site mitigation, he notes that "[tihe [CEQ] regulations do not discuss the issue of
whether mitigation measures can justify a FONSI. Federal courts, however, have...
upheld the use of mitigation measures to justify FONSI's." Id. See also Donohue,
supra note 10, at 692 (author does not specifically mention off-site mitigation as a justifi-
cation for a FONSI).
31. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1990) which provides:
"Mitigation" includes:
(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an
action.
(b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and
its implementation.
(c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected
environment.
(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and mainte-
nance operations during the life of the action.
(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources
or environments.
Id.
32. See Herson, supra note 12, at 52 (stating that "CEQ regulations require only
that agencies discuss mitigation measures in a full EIS" and fail to discuss "whether
mitigation measures can justify a FONSI." (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(0 (1985))). 40
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supporting a FONSI through mitigation.33 Agencies argue that if they
determine at the EA stage that mitigation can minimize environmental
impacts to insignificant levels, then they can forego an EIS. Techni-
cally, NEPA does not require an EIS if an agency determines that the
project has no significant impact on the environment,34 and courts
overwhelmingly defer to an agency's interpretation of the CEQ
regulations.35
A subsequent CEQ pronouncement 36 attempted to moot this issue
and permit mitigation proposals to support the issuance of a FONSI.
However, CEQ's statement, contained in its "Forty Questions" docu-
ment, met with substantial criticism because it only permitted mitiga-
tion to support a FONSI under limited circumstances. CEQ's "Forty
Questions" states:
Mitigation measures may be relied upon to make a finding of no
significant impact only if they are imposed by statute or regula-
tion, or submitted by an applicant or agency as part of the original
proposal. As a general rule, agencies.., should not rely on the
possibility of mitigation as an excuse to avoid the EIS
requirement.
In some instances, where the proposal itself so integrates miti-
gation from the beginning that it is impossible to define the propo-
sal without including the mitigation, the agency may then rely on
the mitigation measures in determining that the overall effects
would not be significant.3 7
Agencies refused to adhere to the CEQ's stringent requirements. In
addition, the courts thwarted challenges that called for the agencies to
enforce these suggested mitigation guidelines and strengthened agency
resolve in refusing to implement these safeguards.38 Courts uniformily
consider CEQ's statement on mitigation measures merely persuasive
C.F.R. § 1502.14 "is the heart of the environmental impact statement." 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.14 (1990).
33. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(0, 1502.16(h) (1990). See also supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
34. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (holding that an EIS is not required if "the proposal is modified prior to
implementation by adding specific mitigation measures which completely compensate
for any possible adverse environmental impacts stemming from the original proposal").
36. See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Pol-
icy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,038 (1981) [hereinafter Forty Questions].
37. Id.
38. See Friends of the Earth v. Iintz, 800 F.2d 822, 838 (9th Cir. 1986).
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authority because it is not a CEQ regulation.3 9
The result is that there are no specific guidelines ensuring the effec-
tive implementation of mitigation proposals. The lack of any clear
statutory mandate concerning mitigation procedures is especially detri-
mental to the environment when agencies implement off-site proposals
and issue FONSIs. ° Although the lack of off-site mitigation guide-
lines permits agencies to fashion creative compromises between aban-
doning a project and preventing significant environmental harm, it
allows agencies to leave other crucial long-term considerations
unresolved.
Agencies are discouraged from closely scrutinizing off-site plans
which inherently involve uncertainty in both their implementation and
potential effectiveness. As agencies proliferate the use of off-site miti-
gation to support FONSIs the environmental effects will be disas-
trous.41 Without the benefit of in-depth political analysis, including
hearings, reports and other informational data, no recognizable legal
distinction exists between on-site and off-site mitigation.42
Various circumstances may account for legislative skirting of this
39. Id. at 837 n.15 ("[T]he CEQ forty questions document is not a regulation, but
merely an informal statement and is not controlling authority." (citing Louisiana v. Lee,
758 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1044 (1986); Cabinet Moun-
tain Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 682)); but see Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 880 (1st
Cir. 1985) ("Mitigation cannot, by itself, render impacts 'insignificant' unless the miti-
gation measures are 'imposed by statute or regulation, or submitted... as part of the
original proposal.'" (quoting Forty Questions, supra note 36, at 18,038)).
40. See Forty Questions, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
41. See Goldman-Carter, supra note 20, at 22.
42. The differences and considerations involved in each of these methods are ex-
tremely significant. Many courts, when faced with off-site mitigation proposals, have
stated that on-site mitigation is preferred. Several commentators have also noted the
danger of off-site mitigation in several different environmental contexts. See, eg., Helen
M. Kennedy, Comment, The 1986 Habitat Amendments to the Magnuson Act: A New
Procedural Regime for Activities Affecting Fisheries Habitat, 18 ENVTL. L. 339, 362
(1988) (suggesting that the EPA, when considering dredge and fill permits, should al-
ways "favor on-site mitigation and replacement of in-kind fisheries habitat because di-
verse fishery stocks are habitat specific"); see also Goldman-Carter, supra note 20, at 22
(arguing that "wetlands restoration and creation [an example of off-site mitigation]
should be permitted as compensation only for unavoidable wetlands losses"); Kennedy,
supra, at 343 n.13 ("'The HEP can result in trading off harm to an entire ecological
community for actions benefiting a few species." (citing Fish and Wildlife Part III,
1985: Hearings on H.R. 2704 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conserva-
tion and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1985) (statement of Robert Davison, Legislative Representative,
National Wildlife Federation))).
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topic. First, off-site mitigation is an appealing option at the EA level
for agencies that are increasingly burdened, as a result of NEPA, with
evaluating more and more environmental impacts in their decision-
making process.4 3 Second, on its face, the substitution of resources for
those destroyed at the project site appears to maintain the status quo.
4 4
Perhaps that is one reason environmental groups challenged only a
handful of off-site projects as compared with on-site projects. 4 5 Envi-
ronmental groups have limited resources available to monitor and chal-
lenge these seemingly harmless agency decisions. 46 Third, the
bureaucracy finds the off-site mitigation option appealing because, in
the short-term, the issuance of a FONSI is less costly and time con-
suming than preparing an EIS.4 7 In addition, the public and other
agencies are not permitted to partake in a review and comment period
which an EIS preparation requires.48
Generally, the CEQ and judicial validation of mitigation as support
for a FONSI is desirable for on-site mitigation proposals.49 Site-
43. See Kent & Pendergrass, supra note 12, at 12 (noting that agencies prepared
approximately 1700 EISs per year in the mid-1970s while only 577 were prepared in
1984).
44. See supra notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text. See also Goldman-Carter,
supra note 20, at 22 ("[A]ny mitigation plan based on wetlands creation must recognize
that created wetlands will almost never fulfill the full range of functions of natural wet-
lands. Consequently, one acre created for one acre destroyed will rarely compensate for
the loss."); Donohue, supra note 10, at 713 (the status quo may not be maintained
because there is "no assurance that wetland replacement would be successful").
45. See supra note 19.
46. See Kent & Pendergrass, supra note 12, at 14 ("Environmental groups... gen-
erally have fewer economic resources [and] ... partly because of these economic limits,
environmental groups chose [sic] the cases they litigate very carefully.").
47. See CEQ, Environmental Impact Statements: An Analysis of Six Years' Expe-
rience by Seventy Federal Agencies 2, 43-45 (1976) (CEQ downplayed the costs and
project delays resulting from EIS preparation); see also Forty Questions, supra note 36,
at 18,037 (suggesting EAs be no longer than 10-15 pages); 40 C.F.R § 1502.7 (1990)
(EISs should "normally be less than 150 pages and for proposals of unusual scope or
complexity... less than 300 pages").
48. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 n.13
(1989) (referring to CEQ regulations mandating review and comment period after EIS
prepared); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1, 1506.6 (1990) (the public has less opportunity to com-
ment on an EA than on an EIS). See also Forty Questions, supra note 36, at 18,038
(CEQ discouraged FONSIs justified by mitigation proposals because the agencies can
forego the public and agency review and comment period required for an EIS which is
considered "essential to ensure that the final decision is based on all the relevant
factors").
49. See Donohue, supra note 10, at 695 ("[L]ogic and reason support the FONSI-
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specific measures are certainly a plausible way to decrease significant
environmental impacts. But off-site proposals require more stringent
review. A FONSI does not provide sufficient disclosure and informa-
tion to allow the agencies, courts and the public to thoroughly evaluate
a solution that continues to permit significant impacts at the project
site.50
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF OFF-SITE PROPOSALS: CEQ AND NEPA
PROCEDURAL MANDATES
Because NEPA influences substantive agency decisions through its
procedural mandate, strict adherence to those procedures is crucial.5 1
Traditionally, a FONSI is issued where the agency's EA concludes that
mitigation measures reduce environmental impacts to insignificant
levels.5 2 If, however, the agency determines that the proposed activity
mitigation rule.... It is reasonable not to demand a full-scale EIS if the impact truly
will be insignificant.").
50. See Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 350 n.13 (an agency must "discuss at appropri-
ate points.., any responsible opposing view which was not adequately discussed in the
draft statement and indicate the agency's response to the issues raised" (quoting 40
C.F.R. § 1502.9 (1987))).
51. Courts and commentators recognize NEPA as a purely procedural statute. An
agency's failure to follow NEPA's procedural mandates provides a sufficient basis for
reversing its decision. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam) (emphasizing the procedural nature of NEPA and
holding that a reviewing court is limited to ensuring that an agency has considered the
environmental impacts); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (explaining that NEPA's mandate is essen-
tially procedural); Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
817 F.2d 609, 620 (10th Cir. 1987) ("Although labeled an 'environmental statute,'
NEPA is in essence a procedural statute."); Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667
F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1982) (NEPA creates procedural obligations "designed to insure
that the agency 'stop, look, and listen' before moving ahead"); Prince George's County,
Maryland v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181, 1183 (D.D.C. 1975) (NEPA "is essentially a
procedural and disclosure statute").
52. CEQ outlines several factors the courts should consider when making this
threshold determination. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1990) provides in part:
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results in significant impacts, it must prepare an EIS.53 The EIS must
include a discussion of both avoidable and unavoidable impacts, and
feasible alternatives to the proposed action.
5 4
Consequently, an EIS and a FONSI convey significantly different
messages to the public and other agencies interested in monitoring fed-
eral actions under NEPA.55 While the EIS suggests a need for further
environmental sensitivity, the issuance of a FONSI conveys the oppo-
"Significantly" as used in NEPA requires considerations of both context and
intensity:
(b) Intensity. This refers to the severity of impact ... The following should be
considered in evaluating intensity:
(3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to... wet-
lands, wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical areas.
(5) The degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are
highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks.
Id. See also supra note 3.
53. Courts differ in their determination of the role mitigation plays in rendering
impacts insignificant. See Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir. 1985) (miti-
gation measures must render the environmental impacts to less than significant levels in
order to support a FONSI), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1044 (1986); Cabinet Mountains
Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (an EIS is not required
when "specific mitigation measures... completely compensate for any possible adverse
environmental impacts stemming from the original proposal"); Maryland Nat'l Capital
Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("[C]hangees [sic] in the project are not legally adequate to avoid an impact state-
ment unless they permit a determination that such impact as remains, after the change,
is not 'significant.' "). But see Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d
976, 987 (9th Cir. 1985) ("In this circuit, so long as significant measures are undertaken
to 'mitigate the project's effects,' they need not completely compensate for adverse envi-
ronmental impacts." (quoting Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860
(9th Cir. 1982))).
54. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1990). An EIS "shall provide full and fair discussion of
significant environmental impacts and shall inform decision-makers and the public of
the reasonable alternatives which would void or minimize adverse impacts." Id.
55. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (Ist Cir. 1985). In acknowledging the
different purposes served by an EA and an EIS, the Marsh court stated:
An EA aims simply to identify (and assess the 'significance' of) potential impacts
on the environment; it does not balance different kinds of positive and negative
environmental effects, one against the other.... An EIS helps [officials] make their
decision by describing and evaluating the project's likely effects on the environ-
ment.... To treat an EA as if it were an EIS would confuse these different roles,
to the point where neither the agency nor those outside it could be certain that the
government fully recognized and took proper account of environmental effects in
making a decision with a likely significant impact on the environment. For one
thing, those outside the agency have less opportunity to comment on an EA than
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site view.56 Thus, under NEPA's present procedural framework, if an
EIS is not prepared because of off-site mitigation, agencies and the pub-
lie may not be able to adequately consider the unique environmental
questions raised by the potential implementation of an off-site plan.57
Courts will not review an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS
until the challenging party satisfies its initial burden of proof. Unfortu-
nately, courts differ on what is necessary to satisfy this burden.5" For
some courts, a showing that the action may cause significant harm is
adequate.59 Other courts require the challenging party to establish that
the action will have a significant impact on the environment." °
While judicial disparity continues to exist as to a challenging party's
burden of proof, the Supreme Court has just recently resolved a split
among the circuits involving the applicable standard of review for as-
sessing an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS.61 In Marsh v. Ore-
on an EIS. For another thing, those inside the agency might pay less attention to
environmental effects when described in an EA than when described in an EIS.
Id. at 875 (citations omitted) (citing Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 951 (Ist Cir.
1983); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1, 1506.6 (1984)).
56. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
57. If a federal agency makes a determination of no significant impact, the regula-
tions require the agency to make its finding available for public review. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1501.4(eX1) (1990). Public cooperation and comment are invaluable to preparing and
analyzing the EIS.
58. See Garver, supra note 25, at 206-07 ("[C]ourts have differed over whether a
challenger must show (1) that an action will have a significant impact; (2) that a sub-
stantial possibility eiists that the action will have a significant impact; or (3) that the
action might have a significant impact.").
59. See, eg., Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
681 F.2d 1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (the plaintiff must "allege facts which, if true,
show that the proposed project may significantly degrade some human environmental
factor" (quoting Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585,
597 (9th Cir. 1981))).
60. See, e.g., LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389, 397 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The plaintiff
need not show that significant effects will in fact occur, but if the plaintiff raises substan-
tial questions whether a project may have a significant effect, an EIS must be
prepared.").
61. Previously, quite a bit of confusion existed among the circuits as to the standard
of review which the courts need to employ in reviewing an agency's decision to forego
preparation of an EIS. See Donohue, supra note 10, at 717 & n.206.
The First, Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits reverse an agency decision only if
it is arbitrary and capricious; the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth adhere to a "rea-
sonableness" standard of review; and the District of Columbia Circuit employs a
four-part test incorporating the "hard look" doctrine.... The Third and Eleventh
Circuits' practices are apparently in accord with the "reasonableness" approach,
while the Sixth Circuit has not chosen among the standards.
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gon Natural Resources Council,6 2 the Supreme Court held that the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied with respect to an
agency decision to prepare a supplemental EIS.63 Notably, the Marsh
Court determined that a decision to prepare a supplemental EIS is sim-
ilar to a decision to prepare an initial EIS. 6 Thus, a fortiori, the stan-
dard of review applicable to a supplemental EIS should parallel that of
an EIS in the first instance. Accordingly, the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review should apply to agency decisions to prepare an
EIS.
65
Courts, applying the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard,
must ensure that agencies take a "hard look" at the potential environ-
mental impacts of their planned actions prior to making their decision
Id. at 717 n.206. But see Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Agric., 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987). The court in Park County painted a significantly
different picture as to how the courts were split. Id. at 621 n.4. The court found that
the Tenth, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits follow the reasonableness standard
while the First, Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits follow the "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" standard. Id. (quoting
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (1982)). For an excellent discus-
sion on the different standards of review previously employed by the circuits, see
Garver, supra note 25, at 199-204.
62. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
63. Id. at 375-76.
64. Id. at 374.
65. The Supreme Court, in Marsh, noted that a court "in making the factual inquiry
concerning whether an agency decision was 'arbitrary or capricious,'... 'must consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there had been a clear error of judgment."' Id. at 378 (quoting Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). Because the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review is a narrow one, it prevents a court from substituting its
judgment for that of the agency. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1988). Not surprisingly, a court must generally be at its most deferential
when reviewing an agency decision to forego preparation of an EIS because such deci-
sions often involve scientific determinations which require a high level of technical ex-
pertise.
When applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, courts have not distinguished
FONSIs supported by on-site mitigation from those supported by off-site mitigation.
For cases involving off-site mitigation, see Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822,
836 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an agency decision that a project does not require an
EIS will be upheld unless unreasonable); Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v.
Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); Preservation Coalition v. Pierce, 667
F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Missouri Coalition for Env't v. United States
Corps of Eng'rs, 678 F. Supp. 790, 792 (E.D. Mo. 1988) ("The principle question
presented here is whether or not the Corps acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasona-
bly concerning the environment in this cause."), aff'd, 866 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 820 (1989).
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regarding whether to prepare an EIS.66 Courts have construed the
"hard look" analysis as requiring the agency to discuss the proposed
mitigation measures and their estimated effectiveness in reducing im-
pacts.67 Review of the mitigation proposal's effectiveness, however, es-
sentially means that only minimal analysis must be provided that
documents a proposal's potential for success. Thus, an agency's deci-
sion not to prepare an EIS will be affirmed unless the agency simply
lists the mitigation measures that it intends to implement.6"
Significantly, in addition to estimating the effectiveness of the mitiga-
tion plan,69 courts reviewing off-site mitigation proposals have also re-
66. The Supreme Court in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) held that
courts are required to consider whether the agency took a "hard look" at the environ-
mental consequences of their actions. Id. at 410 n.21. Later, in Strycker's Bay Neigh-
borhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam), the Court limited
the scope of judicial review to consideration of whether the agency satisfied NEPA's
procedural mandates and forbade courts from engaging in a substantive review of
agency decisions. The Court stated that "once an agency has made a decision subject to
NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency
has considered the environmental consequences." Id. at 227. See also Marsh v. Oregon
Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989) ("NEPA does require that agen-
cies take a 'hard look' at the environmental effects of their planned action. . ."); Robert-
son v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (recognizing the
importance of agencies taking a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of pro-
posed federal action).
67. Courts have been unclear as to the amount of weight the agency's consideration
of mitigation measures deserves. See, eg., Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Maryland-
National, Judge Leventhal laid out four criteria for the court in determining "whether
the agency has supplied convincing reasons why [the] potential impacts are truly insig-
nificant." Id. at 1039-40. The court listed the following criteria:
First, did the agency take a "hard look" at the problem, as opposed to bald conclu-
sions, unaided by preliminary investigation? ... Second, did the agency identify the
relevant areas of environmental concern? ... Third.... does the agency make a
convincing case that the impact is insignificant?... [flourth... [i]f there is impact
of true "significance" has the agency convincingly established that changes in the
project have sufficiently minimized it?
Id. at 1040. Beyond the criteria of review listed by the Maryland-National court, agen-
cies are provided with no other guidelines or direction as to how to implement off-site
mitigation plans and the method used to determine that an EIS is not required.
68. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 588
(9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that merely listing mitigation measures does not satisfy
NEPA's reasoned discussion requirement), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
69. See Steamboaters v. FERC, 759 F.2d 1382, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring
the agency preparing the environmental assessment to assess independently a project's
environmental consequences); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332 (1989) and Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360
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quired agencies to ensure that the implementation of the plan is a
condition precedent to the issuance of a permit.7" Further, the require-
ment restricted agency reliance on third parties to reduce the potential
environmental impacts to insignificant levels.7 Unfortunately, courts
have failed to establish similar safeguards when evaluating off-site miti-
gation plans supporting the issuance of a FONSI.72 The courts also
remain unsympathetic to challengers of agency actions that insist upon
the inclusion of the mitigation plan in the original proposal when used
to justify a FONSI.73 Courts have refused to hold CEQ's statement
concerning the effect of mitigation measures on NEPA's EIS require-
(1989). In Robertson and Marsh, the Supreme Court reversed two Ninth Circuit deci-
sions that required agencies to formulate and adopt a fully developed off-site mitigation
plan in an EIS prior to the issuance of federal permits. The Court in Robertson stated
that "[t]here is a fundamental distinction... between a requirement that mitigation be
discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly
evaluated, on the one hand, and a substantive requirement that a complete mitigation
plan be actually formulated and adopted, on the other." Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352.
Relying on this reasoning, the Court in Marsh reached the same conclusion. Marsh,
490 U.S. at 370-72.
70. See Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 684 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (recognizing the agency's obligation to revoke its permission if applicants do not
comply with project modifications).
71. See Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that an agency acted improperly when it relied on public and private bodies
not within its control to reduce the project's impact on air quality).
72. See Donahue, supra note 10, at 693-94. In considering whether the agency has
a sound basis for determining that a mitigation proposal will accomplish the predicted
reduction in impact, the author lists other factors "including the thoroughness of the
agency's analysis, the number and extensiveness of the mitigation measures proposed,
data provided in support of conclusions, the specificity (and site-specificity) of measures
and conditions, and reliance on opinions and studies of other expert agencies." Id. at
694.
73. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text for a description of agencies' use
of mitigation plans to support a FONSI; see also Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868,
880 (Ist Cir. 1985) (stating that unless statutes or regulations impose mitigation, or the
applicant submits a mitigation plan within the original proposal, mitigation cannot
render impacts insignificant). But see Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 837
n.15 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The CEQ Forty Questions document is not a regulation, but
merely an informal statement and is not controlling authority.") (citing Louisiana v.
Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1044 (1986); Cabinet
Mountains Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 682)). In Sierra Club, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir.
1983), the court imposed an additional requirement with respect to FONSIs supported
by mitigation proposals. The court held that an agency may not proceed with an action
without preparing an EIS if significant impacts may later occur which the agency could
not at that later time forbid or prevent. Id. at 1415.
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ment as binding authority.'
Overall, courts have engaged in cursory and inconsistent analysis of
off-site mitigation in support of a FONSI. The limited scope of review
and the absence of specific agency procedures handcuff the courts from
adequately reviewing agency decisions. Both the Marsh decision and
the CEQ's failure to provide guidelines outlining how and under what
circumstances off-site mitigation can support a FONSI resulted in con-
fusion and poignantly demonstrates the insufficiency of judicial review
of off-site mitigation.75 Ironically, under the present NEPA frame-
work, courts are limited to reviewing whether agencies followed proce-
dures which ultimately fail to ensure the implementation of effective
off-site measures anyway.
The CEQ regulations must be amended to provide additional proce-
dures to ensure the safe and effective implementation of these off-site
plans when the agency decides not to prepare an EIS. Presently, the
CEQ regulations relating to mitigation are scattered and fail to make
any distinction between the treatment of on-site and off-site mitigation,
although several significant and obvious differences exist.76 This lack
of specificity as to what agencies are required to do when faced with an
off-site mitigation proposal has undermined the efficiency of judicial
review and the effectiveness of the NEPA as a whole.
III. SETTING THE TABLE FOR CONSIDERATION OF OFF-SITE
MITIGATION AND THE FONSI
Even though courts and federal agencies have found statutory sup-
port for the use of mitigation,77 both fail to address the unique
problems involved in the increased utilization of off-site mitigation.78
In its "Forty Questions," the CEQ attempted to provide a workable
74. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of CEQ's state-
ment on mitigation measures; see also Forty Questions, supra note 36, at 18,026, 18,038.
75. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text which describes the appropriate
standard courts should apply to review agency decisions to prepare an EIS.
76. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text for an overview of on-site and off-
site mitigation measures and their impact on the necessity for Environmental Impact
Statements.
77. See supra notes 28-49 and accompanying text identifying courts' and federal
agencies' statutory support for the use of mitigation to reduce harmful environmental
impacts.
78. See generally Herson, supra note 12 recommending that CEQ revise NEPA reg-
ulations to expressly validate mitigation measures' use to justify FONSI's, and that the
revisions require increased public and agency review.
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framework from which to fashion effective off-site mitigation guide-
lines.79 "Forty Questions" established the presumption that agencies
prepare an EIS whenever off-site mitigation is contemplated. This
stringent requirement is consistent with the purpose and spirit of
NEPA because off-site proposals do not actually reduce environmental
impacts to insignificant levels at the project site.80
Presently, NEPA's procedural framework allows agency and judicial
analysis of off-site mitigation proposals to ignore important issues con-
cerning the ultimate environmental effects of these actions.8" In con-
trast to an EA's cursory mitigation analysis,8 2 the preparation of an
EIS for off-site mitigation proposals substantially improves the deci-
sion-making process. The EIS serves to better apprise agency decision-
makers of the proposed action's environmental consequences. As a re-
sult, agencies are able to make informed decisions on whether to pro-
ceed with the action.8 3 In addition, the EIS provides the public with
an opportunity to become informed of the environmental impacts.84
The proposal outlined below is a novel way to improve both the
quality of environmental analysis required under NEPA and to remove
the uncertainty that agencies face in determining whether to prepare an
EA or an EIS whenever off-site mitigation measures are advanced. 5
79. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text for excerpts from "Forty Ques-
tions" and a discussion of its effectiveness in establishing mitigation guidelines.
80. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text for a description of NEPA's envi-
ronmental assessment requirement.
81. See supra notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of
off-site mitigation guidelines and its impact on agency behavior.
82. See supra note 47 (Forty Questions suggests that an EA be no longer than 10-15
pages, while an EIS may range between 150-300 pages). See also Sierra Club v. Marsh,
769 F.2d 868, 870 (Ist Cir. 1985) (recognizing that the EA is a "concise" document that
"briefly" discusses the relevant issues (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, 1508.13 (1984))).
83. See McGarity, supra note 4, at 805-07. McGarity suggests that the informa-
tional value of the EIS should take precedence when an agency is confronted with the
threshold issue. Id. at 805. "Regardless of whether an agency is influenced by the
considerations and alternatives set forth in an impact statement, disclosure to the public
has independent value." Id. at 807.
84. See generally McGarity, supra note 4 discussing EIS's informational value to
the public.
85. See TAYLOR, supra note 9 (arguing that since the adequacy of an impact state-
ment is a question of fact, agencies are unable to predict with any certainty how courts
will address individual cases).
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A. A Modest Proposal
First, CEQ regulations should be amended to require the mandatory
preparation of an EIS for all off-site mitigation proposals unless the
agency satisfies the "Forty Questions" criteria.86 This requirement is
consistent with NEPA because section 102(C) states that an EIS is re-
quired for any federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment."87 Although off-site mitigation proposals may
replace significantly affected land, such measures do not reduce the im-
pact at the project site itself to insignificant levels, thus, technically
mandating the preparation of an EIS.88 An agency can avoid this
stringent interpretation of NEPA, however, if it satisfies the exceptions
outlined in "Forty Questions."89
In accordance with this proposal, if an agency relies upon off-site
mitigation to support the issuance of a FONSI, then an EIS would not
be required when a statutory or regulatory mandate imposes the off-site
mitigation measures.' This exception assumes that the legislature en-
gaged in a thorough consideration of the measure's effectiveness or that
the concern inherent in such a mandate is of such overriding impor-
tance that such analysis is preempted. If the legislature remains silent,
then the agency may still forego preparation of an EIS when the off-site
mitigation measures are "submitted by an applicant or agency as part
of the original proposal."91 This requirement ensures that the agencies
neither include such proposals late in the EA process nor neglect to
sufficiently analyze their effectiveness.
When an agency suggests or permits the use of off-site mitigation
techniques to justify a FONSI, the "original proposal" must also sat-
isfy additional criteria. First, land purchased off-site must equal or sur-
86. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text discussing the "Forty Questions"
criteria.
87. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(1988). See also supra note 3 and accompanying text discussing NEPA's disclosure
requirements.
88. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of mitigation
measures' use in preparing EA's to circumvent the EIS requirement.
89. The "Forty Questions" lists two exceptions when mitigation can be relied on to
make a finding of no significant impact and therefore not prepare an EIS. This is al-
lowed only if the mitigation measures "are imposed by statute or regulation, or submit-
ted by an applicant or agency as part of the original proposal." Forty Questions, supra
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pass the area of land significantly affected at the project site.92 Next, if
the mitigating resource is not the same as the habitat being destroyed,
then the proposal must include scientific data demonstrating that the
new ecosystem can be successfully created and maintained.93 Then, to
further ensure that the off-site measures are implemented, the commit-
ment must be legally enforceable.94 If required, the purchase and culti-
vation of the off-site resource must be a condition precedent to the
issuance of the applicable permits.9 5 Moreover, money cannot be used
as a mitigating resource. Finally, the public and agency comment and
review period should be extended at the EA stage when an off-site plan
is part of the original proposal.96
B. Judicial Review of a Modest Proposal
When a party challenges an agency's decision to support a FONSI
with off-site mitigation, the challenging party must have a lower bur-
den of proof. Unless an EIS is prepared, there is no disclosure of essen-
tial information concerning the remaining impacts at the project site
and potential effectiveness of the mitigation proposal. Parties challeng-
ing the agency's decision essentially would need to prepare an EIS-type
document simply to obtain sufficient information to get into court. Al-
ternatively, courts can impose a more stringent burden upon the chal-
lenger when the agency has prepared an EIS.
Once the challenging party meets its burden of proof the scope of
judicial review for off-site mitigation should essentially remain the
92. Thus, if the agency action resulted in the destruction of 10 acres of wetlands
then the off-site mitigation plan must provide for the purchase of 10 acres or more of
replacement.
93. See Arnold van der Valk, Effective Wetlands Policy: Sticks or Carrots?, ENVrL.
FORUM, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 21, 26 ("Studies are also needed to discover the best methods
for restoring wetlands, and how effectively restored wetlands function as environmental
filters.").
94. See Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986).
95. See supra note 70 and accompanying text explaining this conditional permit
issuance approach. See also Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 877 (1st Cir. 1985)
(recognizing that mere promises to mitigate environmental impacts is not enough to
render these impacts insignificant); Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851,
860 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that commitments to mitigate must be "more than mere
vague statements of good intentions").
96. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text explaining reasons for the absence
of in-depth analyses of off-site mitigation plans, and the consequences of this omission.
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same.97 In cases where an agency discusses off-site mitigation in an
EIS the "hard look" standard is sufficient." The additional safeguards
courts adopted ensure that the agency provides an adequate discussion
of off-site measures in its EIS and does not merely list the measures to
be taken. 99
Courts reviewing an off-site mitigation proposal supporting a FONSI
should apply the "hard look" analysis with the further requirement
that the court ensure that the agencies abide by the criteria listed
above. The fact that the agency followed these procedures is enough to
ensure that the agency engaged in a thorough analysis of the off-site
mitigation proposal's potential effectiveness. Consequently, courts
would not need to substantively review scientific documentation of the
mitigation proposal's potential effectiveness.oo
C. Critical Review of the Modest Proposal
Critics may argue that the above proposal essentially transforms the
EA into an EIS. This criticism, however, is unwarranted. If the pro-
posed action is relatively minor in scale, and habitat conversion studies
become more readily available (if they are even required), then the con-
tent of the proposal and the analysis required would be consistent with
an EA.101 Indeed, if the project is massive and large parts of the envi-
ronment will be destroyed and replaced elsewhere, then an EIS should
probably be prepared. 102
97. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text discussing the applicable standard
of judicial review for agency decisions concerning the necessity for an EIS.
98. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351-52 (1989)
(discussing actions which guarantee that the agency has undertaken the required "hard
look" analysis); see also supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text recognizing additional safeguards
for evaluating off-site mitigation plans supporting a FONSI.
100. But cf. Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review
Under NEPA, 88 HARV. L. R.v. 735, 756-58 (1975) (arguing for an intermediate sub-
stantive judicial review theory).
101. See J. Michael Luzier, Putting States in the Driver's Seat, ENVTL. FORUM,
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 20, 24. Luzier, commenting specifically on off-site mitigation and
wetlands, states that the "EPA should continue to develop the technical standards for
mitigation." Id. Further, a statutory protection plan should identify "procedures for
mitigation 'banking,' or creating or restoring degraded wetlands as compensation for
altering other wetlands sites." Id.
102. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 874 (1st Cir. 1985) ("In most cases...
a lengthy EA indicates that an EIS is needed" (quoting Forty Questions, supra note 36,
at 18,037)).
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Another argument may emphasize the cost involved in requiring the
preparation of an EIS under such broad circumstances. This argument
fails for three reasons. First, as a purely legal response, under NEPA
an EIS must be prepared whenever substantial questions are raised that
a project may cause significant degradation of the environment regard-
less of cost. 103 Technically, an off-site mitigation plan does not mini-
mize the environmental impacts at the project site, it simply replaces
the lost resource."°
Second, on an environmental level, the circumstances surrounding
the implementation of off-site mitigation and the uncertainty surround-
ing the success of converting a substitute resource may often outweigh
the expense of preparing an EIS. Third, on an economic level, if a
private party is involved, agencies can require the applicant to pay all
or part of the costs resulting from the EIS preparation."15
D. Benefits of the Modest Proposal
Agencies and courts have taken all of the easy steps in satisfying
NEPA and now must make some hard choices. This proposal is a
novel approach to analyzing the different problems posed by off-site
mitigation. The proposal recognizes the need for in-depth review of
off-site mitigation proposals while also recognizing that, if the contem-
plated program is relatively small in scale, the purpose of the EA and
103. See Garver, supra note 25, at 212.
Examination of the extent to which an EA balances factors is crucial in evaluat-
ing the validity of a FONSI. While an agency is free to recognize social and eco-
nomic factors that favor an action, those factors can never justify the decision to
forgo an EIS. Only after preparation of an EIS can an agency determine that eco-
nomic and social factors outweigh significant environmental impacts and thereby
justify a decision to proceed with an action.
Id.
104. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of off-site mitiga-
tion measures and their effectiveness.
105. See Weiss, supra note 9, at 786 nn.34-37 (citing TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 164
n.2, 399 n.13 & app. E). The author quotes some significant findings from Taylor's
study. Id. "Taylor questioned the veracity of the conventional complaint by agencies
that the EIS process significantly reduces efficiency and increases costs." Id. at 786
n.35. Taylor also found that "the evidence of costs added to federal projects by NEPA
EIS requirements inconclusive." Id. at 786 n.37. Finally, Taylor's study reported For-
est Service personnel believed that "they would have been - or 'should' be - gathering
virtually the same kind of [environmental] information whether or not the EIS process
required it." Id. at 786 n.34 (citing TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 399 n.13).
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FONSI alternative is still viable and may be observed." 6 More impor-
tantly, agencies are provided with a clear standard that allows environ-
mental groups to challenge concrete areas in off-site proposals that
agencies have ignored, while also providing agencies and courts with
more certainty of their NEPA responsibilities.
10 7
The advent of off-site mitigation into NEPA's procedural process
significantly minimizes its substantive effect by assuring that agencies
consider environmental impacts in their decision-making. NEPA is a
self-enforcing statute and requires agencies to follow NEPA's proce-
dures in good faith. The public and the courts are the watchdogs. The
public becomes informed of potential environmental impacts through
the EIS disclosure process. If the information is not disclosed through
the EIS process or as a result of the suggested amendments to the EA
requirements, then the public cannot challenge these decisions and ju-
dicial review is impossible."'0
IV. CASE STUDY OF OFF-SITE MITIGATION - A CALL FOR
STRINGENT REVIEW
The cases examined in this section are particularly useful in analyz-
ing the deficiencies inherent in NEPA's existing procedural frame-
work."°9 Comments on each case and the mitigation plans are merely
intended to highlight the insufficiency of agency and judicial review of
off-site mitigation plans justifying a FONSI. Most importantly, the
cases help emphasize the significant potential for environmental harm
as use of these plans proliferates. Hopefully, the case study also illus-
trates the potential for improvement in both agency decision-making
and judicial review of off-site mitigation plans if the above mentioned
plan was implemented.
106. See supra note 49 and accompanying text discussing using on-site mitigation
proposals to reduce the need for a full-scale EIS.
107. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited
scope of review and the absence of agency procedures regarding off-site mitigation pro-
posals. The proposed procedural framework may actually save litigation costs because
challengers may bring fewer frivolous suits.
108. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text for an overview of NEPA's disclo-
sure requirements and the functions these requirements serve.
109. See supra notes 28-76 and accompanying text discussing NEPA's existing pro-
cedural framework and its failure to explicitly address mitigation.
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A. Friends of the Earth
Any case study of off-site mitigation as support for a FONSI must
begin with Friends of the Earth v. Hintz. 1 o In Hintz, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals first coined the term "off-site" mitigation and ac-
knowledged its unique concerns. 11 The Hintz court held that the
purchase of substitute wetlands, as outlined in a mitigation agree-
ment,112 could be used to support the Army Corps of Engineers' deci-
sion not to issue an EIS.113 The private party in Hintz applied to the
Corps for a section 404 permit authorizing his logging company to dis-
charge toxic fill material into a seventeen acre wetlands area. 1 4 The
Corps, relying upon the mitigation agreement, issued the permit after
110. 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986).
111. Id. at 837-38.
112. The mitigation agreement stated:
1. ITT Rayonier, Inc., (IT) and a resource agency committee (representatives of
the US Environmental Protection Agency; US Department of the Interior, Fish
and Wildlife Service; US Army Corps of Engineers; and the Washington Depart-
ment of Game (WDG)), representing the State of Washington, have agreed that
land mitigation for ITT's unauthorized fill in Bowerman Basin, Grays Harbor,
should involve purchase of a portion of a 66-acre property located at the Elk River
in South Bay, Grays Harbor. This Elk River site is predominately high salt-marsh
that was converted to pastureland by placement of a dike and tide gates. The terms
of the mitigation agreement are described below. Issuance of a Department of the
Army permit shall initiate the timing of the agreement terms.
2. ITT will pursue the purchase of 17.0 acres of Elk River site and will transfer
the title of this land to WDG.
3. If the land purchase has not been accomplished within 6 months of the date of
the Department of the Army permit, ITT agrees to make available to the WDG
(within 30 days written notice) the total sum of $25,500 for the purpose of purchas-
ing 17.0 acres of the Elk River site. These funds will be held by ITT and will be
available to WDG for up to an additional 3 years. ITT agrees to increase the total
sum by 8 percent per year (compounded annually) as long as the funds are in their
possession. Funds not required for purchase of the 17.0 acres at the Elk River site
will be retained by ITT. WDG may request and use the funds for purchase of
mitigation land in Grays Harbor other than the Elk River site subject to approval
by ITT.
4. If the mitigation lands have not been purchased after 3.5 years (6 months plus
3 years per above terms), ITT agrees to transfer a total sum of $32,122.66 to WDG.
WDG agrees to use these funds for purchase and preservation of coastal wetlands
in Grays Harbor.
Id. at 825 n.3.
113. Id. at 838. The court stated that "we see no reason why off-site mitigation
cannot be considered in determining whether to prepare an EIS." Id.
114. 800 F.2d at 826-27.
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engaging in an EA." 5 The Corps concluded that the off-site mitigation
reduced the impact on the environment to insignificant levels, thereby
precluding the need for an EIS.
1 16
The mitigation agreement required Hintz to purchase a seventeen
acre site that would be converted into wetlands to replace those being
destroyed by the toxic fill material. The agreement contemplated that
the Washington Department of Game (WDG) would receive the site
after its conversion. If Hintz failed to purchase the site within a six
month period, the agreement required Hintz to pay the WDG
$25,500.1 17 An additional provision permitted Hintz to forego the
purchase of the site altogether and simply pay $32,122.66 to the State
Game Department after a three and one-half year period."'
Several disturbing elements exist concerning the off-site mitigation
plan and the acquiescence of the agency and the court in permitting its
implementation. First, the agency did not engage in, and the court did
not require, any analysis of the effectiveness of the mitigation plan." 9
Such an analysis is especially important where the proposal contem-
plates the creation of a new resource. Second, the purchase and con-
version of the site was not a prerequisite to Hintz receiving the Corps
permit.12 Although the appellants challenged this deficiency, the
court found it unnecessary to rule on the matter since the applicant
mooted the issue when he purchased the off-site resource.121
A third problem involved the Corps' reliance upon a third party to
implement the plan. Reliance on a third party does not ensure that
implementation is done in a careful and sound manner. The court did
not address this issue. Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the plan
contemplated the use of money as mitigating the effects at the project
site. There was no guarantee that the WDG would use the money to
purchase substitute wetlands nor were they legally obligated to do
115. Id. at 827.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 826. See supra note 112 for the terms of the mitigation agreement.
118. 800 F.2d at 826 n.3. See supra note 112 for the terms of the mitigation
agreement.
119. The court concluded that because the appellants, Friends of the Earth, did not
challenge the adequacy of the off-site mitigation plan "the Corps' decision not to pre-
pare an EIS was reasonable." 800 F.2d at 838.
120. Id. at 826. The EPA and other agencies that reviewed the project expressed
concern that the mitigation agreement did not contain a provision to assure the
purchase of the site. Id. at 826 n.4.
121. Id. at 837.
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so. 122 By refusing to address this issue, the court stated that because
the site was in fact purchased, the issue was moot. 123 Finally, the ap-
pellants relied upon CEQ's "Forty Questions" for their contention that
off-site mitigation could not preclude the need for an EIS. 24 The court
disagreed and refused to entitle "Forty Questions" to substantial
deference.125
This case illustrates the inconsistent and cursory treatment that off-
site mitigation proposals receive under the present NEPA framework.
Under this Article's suggested proposal, an EIS would have to be pre-
pared unless the mitigation agreement was either included in the origi-
nal agency proposal or the subject of a procedural or statutory
mandate. Assuming that the mitigation agreement was included as
part of the original agency proposal, the agency could forego prepara-
tion of an EIS if it complied with the additional procedures.
B. Missouri Coalition for the Environment
Missouri Coalition for the Environment v. United States Corps of En-
gineers 126 stressed the importance of relaxing the plaintiff's burden of
proof when challenging off-site mitigation used to support a FONSI.
In Missouri Coalition, the district court found the off-site mitigation
measures adequate to support the agency's decision to issue a
FONSI.127 The proposed mitigation plan provided for the purchase of
ten acres of land and the creation of "new, higher quality wetlands
there."12 The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet their
burden of proof in "raising a substantial environmental issue." 129 As a
122. 800 F.2d at 837.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 837 n.15.
125. Id. In addition, the court addressed whether off-site mitigation could support
an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS and concluded that under CEQ and Corps'
regulations, off-site mitigation could effectively, consistent with NEPA, obviate the need
for an EIS. Id. at 837-38. Furthermore, the court found that because the CEQ's defini-
tion of "mitigation" includes off-site measures, an agency could consider such measures
when deciding whether to issue an EIS. Id. at 838.
126. 678 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 866 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 490 U.S. 820 (1989).
127. Id. at 802.
128. Id. at 794.
129. Id. at 801. The court stated that before it addresses whether the agency rea-
sonably concluded that no EIS was required, the plaintiff must "make a threshold show-
ing that the agency failed to consider facts which, if true, would constitute a substantial
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result, the court refused to engage in any independent analysis of the
off-site mitigation plan to ensure that the agency discussed its esti-
mated effectiveness.
130
The plaintiffs also argued that the agency erroneously denied a pub-
lic hearing at the EA stage.13 ' The court dismissed this challenge on
the ground that it was within the Corps' discretion to refuse a public
comment period.' 3 2 The significance of denying the public hearing is
twofold. First, the public is denied the opportunity to evaluate the
plan and suggest possible alternatives. Second, the potential impacts
and effectiveness of the plan are not disclosed. If the public is denied
this basic information, the public may later fail to meet its burden of
proof and the courts will not have an opportunity to review the
proposal. 133
V. CONCLUSION
Only a comprehensive EIS will ensure that agencies adopt the safest
and most effective off-site mitigation measures. The CEQ regulations
support this view and discourage FONSIs justified by off-site mitiga-
tion except in limited circumstances. To encourage full disclosure and
public participation in the NEPA process the CEQ, in "Forty Ques-
tions," mandates the preparation of an EIS whenever an action may
have significant impacts on the environment regardless of mitigation
unless such measures are imposed by law or included in the original
proposal. Hopefully, the CEQ regulations will be amended so that the
courts can regard this proposal as binding on the agencies.
The present NEPA procedural framework allows and even encour-
ages both agencies and courts to engage in cursory and inadequate re-
view of off-site mitigation. A legal distinction between on-site and off-
site mitigation must be acknowledged in order to improve the decision-
making process. While it is undeniable that mitigation should remain
an agency option to be utilized to avoid preparing a FONSI, the cir-
impact on the environment." Id. See also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text
discussing the challenging party's initial burden of proof.
130. 678 F. Supp. at 801-02. The court did note that the agency must indepen-
dently evaluate information concerning mitigation measures and cannot rely on the
analysis of third parties. Id. at 802.
131. Id. at 797.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 3 and accompanying text describing NEPA's disclosure
requirements.
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cumstances under which this can be done need to be clearly outlined.
Only then will judicial review of these proposals assure that NEPA's
substantive mandate is satisfied.
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